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Assembly Bill 251: School's Out for
New Residents
The California Education Code requires that nonresident students
attending California public colleges and universities pay nonresident
tuition.' Students entering school in 1982 who are classified as nonresi-
dents can expect to pay about $4,500 more per year than students clas-
sified as residents if attending one of the University of California
campuses,2 and approximately $2,800 more per year if attending a divi-
sion of the California State University and Colleges.3
The Education Code defines residence for tuition purposes and pro-
vides procedures for residence determination. A determination of resi-
dency is made initially upon enrollment; each student is classified a
resident or nonresident, based on information provided by the student.4
At the beginning of each subsequent term students may apply for
reclassification.5
Formerly, the Education Code prescribed a three-part test for resi-
dence determination. Admissions officers were directed to grant resi-
dent status to students who had legal capacity to establish residence,6
had been physically present in the state for more than one year,7 and
had manifested intent to make California their bona fide residence.8
Apparently, the former test permitted too many students without good
faith intentions of remaining in California following graduation to cre-
ate sham residences to avoid paying nonresident tuition.9 Assembly
1. CAL. EDuc. CODE §68050 ("A student classified as a nonresident shall be required, ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this part, to pay, in addition to other fees required by the institution,
nonresident tuition.").
2. Ic §§68040, 68041.
3. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41907; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§68023, 68041.
4. 1981-82 General Catalog, University of California, Davis, at 37.
5. Spring 1982 Class Schedule, California State University, Sacramento, at 5.
6. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§68061, 68062(0, (g).
7. Id §68017.
8. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §,41905; CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062(d).
9. See REPORT OF THE LEOIsLATivE ANALYST, Analysis of the Budget Bill (fiscal year 1981-
1982) 1242 [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIvE ANALYST] ("Under the current stat-
utory definition of residency, virtually all nonresident students from other states are eligible for
resident status after one year. All a student need do to obtain residency is live in the state one year
(the first year of academic attendance plus the summer months) and show intention to remain in
California through such actions as registering to vote in California, obtaining a California driver's
license, and joining local organizations. Consequently, most nonresident students from other
states within the U.S. are only 'technical nonresidents' who are in the process of establishing
California residency. As a result, they usually pay nonresident tuition for only one year.").
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Bill 251,10 signed into law by the Governor on June 28, 1981, included
an amendment to the Education Code intended by the Legislature to
overcome this problem.' The amendment adds a fourth requirement
to the three-part test; students must now show financial independence
from their parents as a condition to gaining resident status.'2
A student is considered financially independent, as defined by the
new law, when all of the following criteria are present: (1) the student
has not been and will not be claimed as an exemption for state or fed-
eral tax purposes by his parent(s) in the year application for reclassifi-
cation is made or in any of the three preceding years; (2) the student
has not received and will not receive more than $750 in financial assist-
ance from his parent(s) in the year application for reclassification is
made or in any of the three preceding years; and (3) the student has
not stayed and will not stay more than a total of six weeks in the home
of his parent(s) during the year application for reclassification is made
or in any of the three preceding years. 13 A student who fails to satisfy
any one of these requirements is considered a dependent and conse-
quently classified a non-resident.
This comment will show that the new statutory requirement of
financial independence, as defined by the amendment, and as inter-
preted and implemented by the governing boards' 4 of the respective
systems of public higher education, unconstitutionally denies many stu-
dents their rights to due process and equal protection of the law. First,
attention will be directed to the language in the amendment, the official
interpretation of legislative intent by the governing boards, and the
practical impact at the campus level of the amendment as thus inter-
preted. This will be followed by a discussion of those personal rights
guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions that are affected
by the amendment. The strongest opposition to Assembly Bill 251 is
drawn from the California Constitution and opinions by the Supreme
Court of California interpreting state law. The primary theory of un-
constitutionality asserted by this comment, therefore, is that Assembly
Bill 251 denies lower tuition to a class of bona fide residents in viola-
tion of equal protection under the state constitution. Prior to an attack
of the amendment on state grounds, 15 however, the theory that Assem-
bly Bill 251 creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption under
10. CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 102, 338, at 18.
11. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §68044.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id §68012 (definition of governing board).
15. See generally Comment, Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Re-
aity of Constitutional Ideals, 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 1157 (1977).
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the federal Constitution invites consideration. The amendment will be
analyzed according to the standard of judicial review that arguably
would be applied under either theory by the court in an action chal-
lenging the statute's constitutionality.
INTERPRETING ASSEMBLY BILL 251
This section will develop some background relating to the enactment
of Assembly Bill 251 to identify latent ambiguity in the language of the
amendment. The official interpretation resolving the ambiguity will be
discussed and an argument will be presented that lends support to this
seemingly harsh application of the law by college and university
officials.
Assembly Bill 251 was the trailer bill to the 1981 budget for the State
of California. Based on a proposal by the Legislative Analyst, 6 the
budget reduced the appropriation from the General Fund to the Cali-
fornia State University and Colleges by $2.4 million,' 7 and to the Uni-
versity of California by $2.9 million.'8 Then, as the means of
recouping this revenue, the Legislature included a provision in Assem-
bly Bill 251 requiring that "the financial independence of a student
seeking reclassification' 9 as a resident shall be included among the fac-
tors to be considered in the determination of residency."2 The actual
dollar amounts by which the budget was reduced were based on a pro-
jection by the Analyst forecasting revenue that could be generated
through nonresident tuition pursuant to the amendment.2'
Historically, the test for determining residence has been the same for
both initial enrollees and continuing students seeking reclassification as
residents.22 The Education Code directs admissions officers to make
three findings of fact before granting a student's request for resident
classification. First, the student must be legally capable of establishing
residence.2 3 Unemancipated minors, for example, whose parents are
16. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, supra note 9, at 1242.
17. CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 99, Item 661-001-001 (the Budget Bill).
18. Id C. 99, Item 644-001-001.
19. Apparently, by requiring the financial independence of only those students seeking
reclassification, the Legislature intended the amendment to apply to students who have been clas-
sified as nonresidents once already, under the old residence test. Applying the amendment to
initial enrollees would require the financial independence of residents as well as nonresidents.
20. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §68044. See also Memorandum from the Office of the General
Counsel of the Trustees of the California State Universities and Colleges to Residence Clerks,
July 21, 1981 (copy on file at the Pac#Fc Law Journal). [hereinafter cited as General Counsel
Memorandum].
21. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, supra note 9, at 1242.
22. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §68041 ("Each student enrolled or applying for admission to an
institution shall provide such information and evidence of residence as deemed necessary by the
governing board to determine his [residence] classification.").
23. Id §68061.
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not residents of California, are legally incapable of establishing their
own independent residence in the state.2 4 Second, the student must
show that he has maintained constructively uninterrupted physical
presence in the state for more than a year. 5 Finally, the student must
demonstrate subjective intent to remain in California.16
Regarding this third element of intent, the Board of Trustees of the
California State University and Colleges was authorized by the Educa-
tion Code to develop a uniform survey of objective evidence useful for
measuring subjective intent.2 7 The adopted test appears in Title 5 of
the California Administrative Code and includes a consideration of
whether the student has: (1) obtained a California driver's license and
vehicle registration, (2) maintained an active California bank account,
(3) voted in California elections, (4) paid California income taxes,
(5) purchased real property in California, (6) obtained a license for
professional practice in California, (7) engaged in litigation for which
California residence is required, (8) maintained active membership in
California social or professional organizations, or (9) exhibited any
other relevant indicia of intent.2 8 The Administrative Code cautions
that "[no single factor is controlling or decisive." 29
Assembly Bill 251 requires that 'the financial independence of a stu-
dent seeking reclassification as a resident shall be included among the
factors to be considered in the determination of residency. ' 30 This lan-
guage is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Did the
Legislature merely intend to include financial independence among the
several factors, found in the Administrative Code, indicating intent to
establish residence?31 Or did the Legislature intend to supplant the ex-
isting three-part test for determining residency with a new four-part
test? Under the latter interpretation, meeting the requirement of
financial independence would represent an additional fact to be proved
by the student seeking reclassification after the requirements of legal
capacity, presence, and intent were satisfied.32
If the first interpretation had been accepted, a student's financial in-
dependence or lack thereof would be considered as merely one factor
24. Id §68062(f),(g).
25. Id §68017; see Michelman v. Frye, 238 Cal. App. 2d 698, 704, 48 Cal. Rptr. 142, 145-46
(1965) ("Absence from one's permanent residence, if all the while he intends the absence only for
a special temporary purpose and to be followed by resumption of the former residence, constitutes
neither abandonment thereof nor a change of residence.").
26. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41905, CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062(d).
27. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68044.
28. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41905.
29. Id
30. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68044 (emphasis added).
31. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
32. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
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among the number of other factors indicating subjective intent to estab-
lish residence, such as whether the student's vehicle was registered in
California, or whether the student maintained a California bank ac-
count. Had this been the Legislature's intent, however, the fact that a
student was not financially independent, like the fact that he had not
opened a bank account, would be subject to the Administrative Code
caveat, "[n]o single factor is controlling or decisive";33 a favorable bal-
ance of other factors would rebut whatever inference of nonresidency
was raised by the student's lack of financial independence. 34  Conse-
quently, students who demonstrated sufficient other indicia of intent to
establish residence would be classified as residents, notwithstanding
their failure to satisfy the financial independence requirement, and they
would not be required to pay nonresident tuition.3" The amendment to
the statute would thus be without effect because the creation of sham
residences by out-of-state students would continue--obviously a result
not intended by the Legislature.36 Furthermore, the legislative objec-
tive of raising $5.3 million through nonresident tuition37 would be
frustrated.
Accordingly, the Office of the Chancellor of the California State
University and Colleges has officially interpreted the new law to mean
that financial independence from one's parents is a separate fact to be
proved, in addition to legal capacity, presence in the state for more
than one year, and intent to establish residence. 38 In a memorandum
from the Chancellor's General Counsel entitled "Implementation of
Assembly Bill 25 1,39 admissions officers were instructed that a stu-
dent's failure to satisfy the financial independence requirement should
"predominate" over favorable evidence of presence and intent except
in a "rare and exceptional" case.4 A sample residence reclassification
33. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41905.
34. See id
35. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, supra note 9, at 1242.
36. See generally Comment, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in
Calfornia: The Needfor Standardized Criteria 12 PAC. L.. 190 (1981).
37. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
38. See General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 17, at 4, 5.
39. General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
40. General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 17, at 5. Because the change in the law was
unanticipated by many students who had enrolled in California state schools relying on prior law,
admissions officers are currently permitted to make an exception when a student can show that he:
has no present financial ties with parent(s); meets all applicable factors evidencing intent; and
undue hardship would otherwise occur--a, the student would be unable to continue his educa-
tion. The burden of proof rests on the student and each element must be supported by adequate
documentation. This exception will be discontinued for future entering classes, who will be on
notice concerning the change in the law. Clearly, it must be discontinued if the legislative direc-
tive to require three years of financial independence is to have any practical effect. Interview with
Scott Plotkin, Assistant Director of Governmental Affairs for the California State University and
Colleges (Dec. 4, 1981) (notes on file at the Pacftc Law Journal).
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worksheet was included in the Chancellor's memorandum; the work-
sheet depicts financial independence as a separate step in the formula
for reclassification. Thus, under the Chancellor's interpretation of the
new law, a student who fails to demonstrate financial independence
from his parents is classified a nonresident, despite positive evidence
that he has lived in the state for more than a year and intends to remain
in California after graduation.
The Chancellor's interpretation is in fact the most reasonable con-
struction of the amendment for several reasons. First, it gives practical
effect to the change in the law by making it impossible for students to
circumvent the new requirement of financial independence by any
means short of postponing their enrollment one year. Second, it is the
only application of the statute that has a chance of raising the projected
$5.3 million in revenue. Finally, the state of a student's past financial
situation seems to bear no logical relation to the student's present intent
to live or not to live in California. Thus, it is unlikely the Legislature
intended the factor of financial independence as an indicator of intent.
Rather, the Legislature more likely intended the requirement of
financial independence to operate as a separate hurdle students must
clear if they are to be reclassified as residents.
The fact, however, that Assembly Bill 251 erects an additional bar-
rier to residence reclassification does not of itself make the amendment
unconstitutional. The evil in Assembly Bill 251 lies in its overbreadth
as implemented.
APPLYING THE NEW LAW
The preceding section presented the official interpretation of Assem-
bly Bill 251 by the Chancellor of the California State University and
Colleges. This section will compare the legislative purpose of the
amendment and the permissible means for accomplishing that purpose
with the results achieved by application of the Chancellor's
interpretation.
Assembly Bill 251 was passed as a revenue-raising measure. 41 The
concern that motivated the Legislature to enact the bill is neatly sum-
marized in a brief supporting the proposed amendment prepared by the
Assembly Education Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education.42
The brief challenged the existing law with this question: "Should the
state allow the dependents of families paying taxes in other states to
41. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
42. EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, REPORT ON AB 1175, 1
(April 16, 1981). The amendment as it appears in AB 251 was originally introduced as AB 1175
by Assemblyman Rogers.
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attend California public institutions without paying out-of-state tui-
tion?"'43 The state purpose, then, is to protect the fiscal integrity of the
California higher education systems by no longer subsidizing the edu-
cation of students who do not contribute to the state treasury through
the payment of taxes. This purpose, however, cannot be achieved per-
missibly by a statute that, regardless of the students' residency, sepa-
rates for disparate treatment students who are dependents of
nonresident parents on the theory that neither they nor their parents
pay taxes in California.' The United States Supreme Court decision
in Shapiro v. Thompson 41 made it clear that legislation may not attempt
to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of their con-
tribution in taxes.' The Court noted that such reasoning "would logi-
cally permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and
libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection."47
The California Education Code conditions lower tuition on proof of
bona fide residence.48 Residents of California are entitled to lower tui-
tion; nonresidents are not. Any means employed to distinguish be-
tween students for the purpose of denying lower tuition, then, must be
intended by the Legislature to distinguish between residents in fact and
those students temporarily present within the state merely for the pur-
pose of receiving an education.
To evaluate the ability of Assembly Bill 251 to distinguish between
true residents and nonresidents through its financial independence test,
the terms "resident" and "nonresident" must be defined. The Govern-
ment Code defines "residence" for general purposes.49 The Education
Code defines "residence" for tuition purposes.50 The two definitions
43. Id
44. See Vlandis v Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 449-50 n.6 (1973).
45. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
46. Id at 632-33.
47. Id at 632.
48. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §68050 whth id §§68017, 68062(b).
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§243, 244.
50. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§68017 ("A 'resident' is a student who has residence, pursuant to
Article 5 (commencing with Section 68060) of this chapter in the state for more than one year
immediately preceding the residence determination date."), 68060 ("Every person has, in law, a
residence."), 68061 ("Every person who is married or 18 years of age, or older, and under no legal
disability to do so, may establish residence."), 68062 ("In determining the place of residence the
following rules are to be observed-
(a) There can only be one residence.
(b) A residence is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other
special or temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.
(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
(d) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent.
(e) A man or woman may establish his or her residence. A woman's residence shall not be
derivative from that of her husband.(f) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his place of
abode is the residence of the unmarried minor child. When the minor lives with neither parent his
residence is that of the parent with whom he maintained his last place of abode, provided the
1099
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are roughly identical. As thus defined, the term "residence" is used to
mean domicile.51 It is defined as the place where one lives when not
called elsewhere for special or temporary purposes, and to which one
intends to return in seasons of repose. 2 Residence is gained by the
union of act (physical presence) and intent, to live in that place exclu-
sively, with no intentions of returning to live elsewhere.5 3 Thus, "resi-
dents" for tuition purposes are students who have maintained
residence, as defined above, for at least one year. 4 "Nonresidents" are
students who either have not been present within the state for more
than a year or have not been present with the intent of establishing
residence.55
Comparing the Legislature's purpose and the permissible means for
achieving that purpose with the actual results produced by the amend-
ment, it appears that the amendment was not drafted in a way that
executes either of these objectives with much accuracy. The provisions
in Assembly Bill 251 requiring proof of financial independence apply
only to enrolled students who are seeking reclassification as residents.5 6
The amendment's definition of financial independence focuses entirely
on the student's relationship to his parent(s).57 Furthermore, the defini-
tion takes into account the student's financial status for the three years
preceding the date of reclassification. These features of the new law
produce some curious results when applied. Some students who have
genuinely decided to establish permanent residence in California will
be unable to show the requisite financial independence. Conversely,
other students who are in California only temporarily for the purpose
of pursuing an inexpensive education will be granted residence status
because they meet the definition of financial independence or are trans-
ferring from another school.5 9 The following examples illustrate situa-
tions when application of Assembly Bill 251 would produce unfair
results.
ExapleA-In 1979 Ann graduates from high school in Nevada where
she lived with her parents. In June, following graduation, Ann moves
minor may establish his residence when both parents are deceased and a legal guardian has not
been appointed.
(g) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be changed by his own
act, by the appointment of a legal guardian, or by relinquishment of a parent's right of control.").
51. Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal. App. 2d 828, 833, 155 P.2d 671, 674 (1945).
52. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062; CAL. Gov'T CODE §244.
53. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062(d).
54. Id §68017.
55. Id §68018.
56. Id §68044. See note 19 supra.
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to California where she has been accepted at a state college. She in-
tends to settle in California as a permanent resident. Over the summer
she works full time and pays California state income tax. Upon enroll-
ment in the fall Ann is initially classified as a nonresident because she
has not lived in the state for more than a year. During the school year
she continues to work part-time and pay taxes. In the beginning of
Ann's second year she applies for reclassification as a resident. Her
application will be denied because she lived with her parents for two of
the three preceding years while a high school student.
Example B-Bill is also attending a state college in California from out
of state. He intends to return to his home state following graduation,
however, to marry his high school sweetheart. Bill makes plans after
one year in school to transfer from his present campus to another.
Since he is applying for an initial classification as a new enrollee, Bill's
residence is determined without reference to his financial indepen-
dence.6" He meets the old test of presence plus intent and is classified
as a resident. Bill's parents could be entirely supporting him; the result
would be the same.
Example C--Carleton, another Nevada high school graduate, lives on
his own in Nevada and is self-supporting, living off his gambling win-
nings, for three years after graduation. Carleton is initially classified as
a nonresident because he has not lived in the state for more than a year.
He applies for and receives comprehensive financial aid. In the begin-
ning of his second year he applies for reclassification as a resident. De-
spite his complete reliance on financial aid, the absence of ties with his
parents makes him financially independent for purposes of the statute.
Assuming he meets the other tests, he is classified as a resident.
The foregoing examples demonstrate that the state's aim of separat-
ing tax-paying students from non-tax-paying students is not always
achieved. From the scenarios proposed above it seems clear that Ann,
the only person contributing to the state treasury through taxes, was
also the only person denied lower tuition.
In addition, the financial independence test does not tend to identify
nonresidents, nor does it tend to exclude residents from classification as
nonresidents. Indeed, in the examples above, despite Ann being the
only student who subjectively intended to establish residence, she was
the only one denied residency classification.
Rather than falling on nonresidents, the burden of the new legisla-
tion will fall primarily on students entering California colleges directly
from high school. Assuming that most students live with their parents
60. Id
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while they are in high school, it will be possible for a student graduat-
ing from high school and continuing directly into college to live four
uninterrupted years in California and never purge his record of the
fictional evidence of nonresidency, regardless of his good faith intent to
establish residence.
In summary, Assembly Bill 251 was intended by the Legislature to
discontinue tuition subsidies to dependents of nonresident parents who
do not pay taxes in California. The permissible means of achieving
that objective is by separating nonresidents from residents and charg-
ing nonresidents higher tuition. Assembly Bill 251 does not accomplish
either of these tasks with much accuracy. The hypothetical examples
above illustrate the amendment's overinclusiveness when the financial
independence formula is applied to determine residence. The next sec-
tion will consider the propriety of employing an indiscriminate formula
when more accurate methods for ascertaining residence are already
available.
DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of...
liberty or property, without due process of law."'" To determine
whether the state, by enacting and enforcing Assembly Bill 251, has
deprived any person of property62 without due process of law requires
an answer to two questions. First, is an interest in lower tuition pro-
tected by the term "property?" Second, what process is due under the
guarantee of due process?
.4. Property Interests
The term "property" encompasses a broad concept of benefits and
interests that cannot be deprived by arbitrary state action.63 In Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth," Justice Stewart's majority opin-
ion articulated the guidelines currently employed by the United States
Supreme Court in determining what benefits or interests qualify as
"property" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. He
wrote:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
62. For a case suggesting that the right to acquire useful knowledge is an attribute of "lib-
erty" protected by the due process clause, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
63. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & . YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 490-96 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NowAK].
64. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
65
Whether interests in a particular case constitute property thus depends
on what rights are conferred by state law in that jurisdiction. Califor-
nia law entitles state residents attending public universities and colleges
to pay lower tuition.66 Under the Roth standard, a property interest
has been created because state law supports a claim of entitlement to
the benefit on a showing of residency. The United States Supreme
Court decision in V/andis v. Kline67 [discussed with further detail in-
fra]68 supports this conclusion. That case was premised on the Court's
recognition that lower in-state tuition is a property interest protected by
the due process clause.6 9
Thus, the benefit of lower tuition, being a right conferred by state
law, is a property interest belonging to all bona fide residents of Cali-
fornia-a property interest that, having been granted to all the state's
residents, cannot be withheld from some of them without due process
of law.7 °
B. What Process is Due
The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires fair
procedure in administrative proceedings when the disposition of an in-
dividual's property is at stake.7" This right to fair procedure is fre-
quently held to require an impartial hearing or some other form of
case-by-case fact-finding, grounded on relevant evidence, prior to the
agency's finalized determination. 72 Whether due process necessitates
special procedure in a particular case is determined by weighing the
individual interest involved, and the value of specific procedural safe-
guards to that interest, against the governmental interest in fiscal and
65. Id at 577. This represents the most narrow view of "property" the Court is likely to take.
Justice Stewart writes for a majority of only five members. The dissenting justices would find
some minimum guarantees to property in the Constitution itself.
66. See 4 Op. Air'y GEN. 181, 183 (community and state colleges are free to residents of
California except that the state colleges may charge limited tuition fees when necessary); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§89703 (maximum tuition fee for residents shall not exceed $25 per year), 89705
(tuition for nonresidents shall not be less than $360 per year). See generally 49 CAL. JUR. 2d
Universities and Colleges §§49-51 (Supp. 1980).
67. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
68. See text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
69. 412 U.S. at 444-45.
70. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975).
71. See generally 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 399 (2d ed. 1978); NOWAK
supra note 63, at 490-512.
72. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam).
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administrative efficiency. 73 In the case of Assembly Bill 251, the im-
portance to the individual of impartial fact-finding weighs heavily be-
cause factual issues are in dispute that will determine his right to
significantly lower tuition. Specifically, the admissions officer must
make a determination of the student's residence. Only when proce-
dures for impartial fact-finding are provided may the individual chal-
lenge an incorrect administrative determination by presenting evidence
of the bona fides of his residence in California.
In contrast, the interest of the state in making this factual determina-
tion by reference to a financial independence formula is meager since
procedures roughly equivalent to an individualized hearing are cur-
rently authorized by statute. The Education Code already provides for
residence determination on a case-by-case basis, including the taking of
individual testimony under oath.74 Moreover, the Administrative Code
permits students to submit other evidence as proof of residence in addi-
tion to the information provided on the school's questionnaires.75 The
provision and authorization of these specific procedures indicates rec-
ognition by the Legislature that a student's subjective intent to retain
former residence or establish California residence can be discovered
only through the testimony of the student and an evaluation of affirma-
tive steps the student has taken to make California his home. The state,
having authorized adequate procedures for the accurate determination
of student residence, has no legitimate need for an inexact formula that
abandons fact-finding in favor of a statutory presumption.
C Irrebuttable Presumptions
Whenever a factual determination in an administrative proceeding is
resolved by reference to a statute rather than by consideration of rele-
vant evidence, the statute must be examined to ascertain whether the
requirement of fair procedure has been satisfied.76 A statute which op-
erates on a presumption that conclusively disposes of the very matter
being contested by the person whose property is at stake denies this
individual a fair opportunity to challenge the matter. To comport with
due process, the statute must either operate on a presumption that is
73. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
74. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§68041 ("An oath or affirmation may be required in connection with
taking testimony necessary to ascertain a student's classification."), 68042 ("The governing board
... may appoint persons to administer oaths or affirmations in connection with taking testimony
necessary to ascertain a student's classification.").
75. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41907 ("Classifications shall be based on evidence presented in,
and supporting, applicants' answers to uniform residence questionnaires and supplemental resi-
dence questionnaires approved by the Chancellor, such further evidence of residence deemed nec-
essary by the institution and such further evidence as the applicant submits.").
76. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973).
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universally true in fact or refer to a fact in issue that cannot be deter-
mined by more reasonable alternative methods.77
In the landmark decision of Viandis v. Kline,7" decided on facts quite
similar to those presented by Assembly Bill 251, the United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute creat-
ing an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency.79 The Connecticut
statute provided that a student attending school in Connecticut would
be classified a nonresident if the student's legal address was outside the
state for any part of the year preceding his or her application for admis-
sion. In addition, the student's classification as initially established
would be effective for the entire period of attendance at that school.80
The offensive feature of the Connecticut statute was not its initial clas-
sification. The Court conceded the right of a state to impose a require-
ment of presence within the state for a reasonable duration as an
element in demonstrating bona fide residence.8l The Court pointed
out, however, that the durational residency requirement must be capa-
ble of being met "while in student status." 2 For this reason, the
Court's primary objection was to the statute's failure to account for stu-
dents who, once enrolled, decided to become permanent residents.8 3 An
antecedent condition, unrelated to their present intent to become resi-
dents, prevented these students from rebutting the presumption of non-
residency. The opinion states:
Assuming that it is permissible for the state to impose a heavier bur-
den of tuition and fees on non-resident than on resident students, the
state may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do not be-
long in that class.84
Two years later in Weinberger v. Safl,85 the Supreme Court upheld a
Social Security Act provision that no survivor's benefits would be paid
to a surviving spouse unless the couple had been married at least nine
months prior to the spouse's death. 6 The C6urt limited its Vlandis
holding to situations in which the statute involvedfpiiports to condi-
tion a governmental benefit on the true status of an applicant, but then
forces the applicant into a given status by making plainly relevant
evidence concerning that status impotent against a statutory
77. Id
78. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
79. Id at 454.
80. Id at 442-43.
81. See id at 452.
82. Id
83. See id at 446.
84. Id
85. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
86. Id at 781.
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presumption. 87
D. Application to Assembly Bill 251
The rule against irrebuttable presumptions, as announced in Plandis
and refined by Sapi, is violated by Assembly Bill 251. The bill repre-
sents an effort to achieve the same results contemplated by the Con-
necticut statute by erecting a slightly different statutory presumption.
In Plandis, it was presumed that a student who registered from out of
state intended to return to his former place of residence following grad-
uation, notwithstanding positive evidence to the contrary. 8 In the
present situation, Assembly Bill 251 creates the presumption that stu-
dents who are presently, or were formerly, dependent on out-of-state
parents for some degree of financial support intend to return to the
state wherein their parents reside.8 9 The same inequitable results that
occurred in Vlandis are occurring under Assembly Bill 251; students
who lived with their parents or received support from them in the year
of, or in any of the three years preceding, their determination date are
classified as "out-of-state students" although some of them do not be-
long in that class.9" Recall that "residence" is defined as the place
where one intends to live exclusively when not called elsewhere for spe-
cial or temporary purposes, and to which one intends to return in sea-
sons of repose.9 The Education Code purports to be concerned with
ascertaining students' residences in fact. The amendment to the Code,
however, abandons this aim in favor of a blunt formula that classifies
as nonresidents all new residents who could be characterized as depen-
dents, or former dependents, of their parents.92 No counterbalancing
offer of proof tending to confirm the genuineness of a student's Califor-
nia residence will rebut this presumption of nonresidency.
The test for constitutionality applied to the Connecticut statute by
the Court in Viandis was articulated as follows:
[It is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the
resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presump-
tion of non-residence, when that presumption is not necessarily or
universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alterna-
87. See id at 772; see also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (a recent Supreme Court
case reaffirming the vitality of 7ands as limited by Safi).
88. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 443 (1973).
89. If the Legislature does not at least justify its classification on the theory that dependence
on nonresident parents can be used as an indicator of intent, the legislative purpose may be imper-
missible. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 48-61 supra.
91. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062; CAL. GOVT CODE §244. See text accompanying notes 49-55
supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
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tive means of making the determination.93
Applying the Jiandis test to Assembly Bill 251, students are denied
resident tuition rates because they do not meet the test for finaicial in-
dependence. Yet that test, as an indicator of residence, is not necessar-
ily or universally true in fact.94 Furthermore, the state has reasonable
alternative means of making the determination of residency. For ex-
ample, the statute could take into account only present financial ties
with parents. The existence of such ties could be considered only as a
factor negating intent to establish residence in California that could be
rebutted by sufficient evidence of intent to stay beyond college. Fi-
nally, this factor could be made applicable to transferring students as
well as continuing students seeking reclassification. By revising the
amendment as proposed, the objective suggested by the Assembly Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education95 would still be achieved: de-
pendents of out-of-state taxpayers who are temporary California
residents, here only for the purpose of obtaining a college education,
would pay nonresident tuition.96
To summarize, students who are residents of California cannot be
denied lower in-state tuition. Due process requires that students be
provided a hearing, or similar fair procedure, to protect against arbi-
trary state action prior to their being denied residence reclassification.
V/andis v. Kline held that fair procedure could not be avoided through
an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency. Assembly Bill 251 erects
a presumption of nonresidency in cases in which new residents are not
"financially independent." Considering that reasonable alternatives
for determining residence are already authorized, Assembly Bill 251
fails the test for constitutionality articulated in Kline. It should there-
fore be amended or repealed.
The next section will analyze Assembly Bill 251 not merely as a con-
clusive statutory presumption, but as an unnecessarily overreaching
classification that infringes a fundamental right to higher education
recognized in California. The argument will be presented, therefore,
that Assembly Bill 251 violates equal protection under the California
Constitution.
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The concept of equal protection of the law embodies the premise that
93. 412 U.S. at 452.
94. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
95. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
96. EDUCATION SuBcoMITrrEE ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, REPORT ON AB 1175, 1
(April 16, 1981).
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persons similarly situated, with respect to the legitimate purpose of the
law, must receive like treatment.97 This proposition, however, does not
preclude the Legislature from making statutory classifications,98 but
simply prevents it from granting privileges to or imposing burdens on a
group of people arbitrarily. When legislation defines a class for special
treatment, equal protection requires that there exist some reasonable
distinction between those included in and those excluded from the
class.99
The "reasonableness" of a classification can be measured by its ten-
dency to include those persons whom the legislation was intended to
affect and to exclude those whom the legislation was not intended to
affect.l10 Thus, the ideal classification would include all of the former
group and none of the latter. A classification that identifies for special
treatment more persons than the legislation was intended to affect is
overinclusive, that is, it reaches out to persons it defines as members of
the class when in fact the legitimate purpose of the law is not furthered
by their inclusion. 0 1 If these people are injured by the law affecting
them, their right to equal protection is violated. 2 This comment has
noted that the legitimate legislative purpose for the classification in As-
sembly Bill 251 is to distinguish residents from nonresidents for the
purpose of charging nonresidents out-of-state tuition. 103 The financial
independence classification must therefore tend to identify students
who are temporarily present within the state merely for the purpose of
receiving an education, and exclude from classification students who
intend to remain in California as permanent residents following gradu-
ation. Judging from the amendment's failure to distinguish nonresi-
dents who are financially dependent from new residents who are
financially dependent, the classification appears to be grossly overin-
clusive. Many students who have genuinely decided to establish their
permanent residence in California will be unable to show the requisite
financial independence."° At the same time, other students who are in
California only temporarily for the purpose of pursuing an inexpensive
education will be granted resident status because they meet the defini-
tion of financial independence or are transferring from another state
97. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 486 P.2d 1201, 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6-7 (1971). See
generaly 5 B. WiTKI, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law §336 (8th ed. 1974).
98. 5 Cal. 3d at 303, 486 P.2d at 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
99. Id
100. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 403 (1973); see also
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 351 (1949).
101. 8 Cal. 3d at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403; see also Tussman & tenBroek,
supra, at 351.
102. 8 Cal. 3d at 877-78, 506 P.2d at 227-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
103. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
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school."' 5 For these reasons, Assembly Bill 251 is subject to equal pro-
tection review to determine whether the financial independence classifi-
cation is constitutionally justifiable.
A. Standards of Review
The United States Supreme Court, in applying the equal protection
clause of the federal Constitution, has developed two standards for re-
viewing legislative classifications. 0 6 The standard of general applica-
tion requires only that the classification drawn by the Legislature be
rationally related to a legitimate state objective.10 7 Under this test, a
statute is not doomed simply because the classification "is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some ine-
quality."108  The second, more intensive standard of review requires
that legislative classifications be drafted in their particular fashion out
of necessity, to achieve a compelling state interest.10 9 This latter, so-
called "strict scrutiny" test applies when the statute under review af-
fects certain personal rights that are deemed "fundamental" or uses
certain sensitive classifications considered "suspect"."
0
The California Supreme Court, in reviewing statutes under the state
constitution, has generally borrowed the vocabulary and applied the
standards devised by the United States Supreme Court."' Thus, Cali-
fornia courts will uphold statutes that are rationally related to a legiti-
mate state objective except when statutes employ suspect classifications
or affect fundamental rights. 1 2 In these latter cases the court will va-
cate a statute that is not necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est.113 Pursuant to the doctrine of adequate state grounds, however, the
California Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness on many
occasions to part ways with the federal trend and discover suspect clas-
105. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
106. See generally NowAK, supra note 63 at 380-84. An intermediate standard of review, re-
quiring that legislation be substantially related to an important governmental objective, has been
applied to statutes involving classifications based on gender, see generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976), or involving classifications disadvantaging non-marital children, see generally Laffi v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
107. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
108. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (quoting Lindsey v. National Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
109. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
110. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
111. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 600, 586 P.2d 916, 926, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435,
445 (1978) (Mosk, J., concurring). The equal protection clauses of the California Constitution
appear in Article I, Section 7(a) ("A person may not be. . .denied equal protection of the laws.");
Article I, Section 7(b) ("A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities
not granted on the same terms to all citizens."); and Article IV, Section 16(a) ("All laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation.").
112. 22 Cal. 3d at 600, 586 P.2d at 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
113. See id at 592, 586 P.2d at 921, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
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sifications or fundamental rights protected under the state constitution
that are unrecognized at the federal level. 14
B Adequate State Grounds
In an early case, Murdock v. City of Memphis,lI" the United States
Supreme Court declared a limit to its jurisdiction preventing review of
state court decisions interpreting state law. 1 6 From this rule has devel-
oped the corollary principle that state court judgments decided on two
alternative grounds, one federal and one state, will not be reviewed if
the judgment can be supported entirely on "adequate and independent
state grounds." 117 While state courts may not, of course, interpret state
law as grounds to deny or dilute the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the federal Constitution,'1 8 state courts are at liberty to interpret their
own constitutions as granting additional rights, or providing increased
protection for rights already protected to some degree by the federal
Constitution. 1 19
C. California Equal Protection
The preceding sections presented general concepts of equal protec-
tion and outlined the standards of review employed by the United
States Supreme Court when testing the constitutionality of state stat-
utes under the federal Constitution. Concerning laws that affect educa-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has generally deferred to the
judgment of the state legislatures. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez12 ° the Court held that education was not a funda-
mental right requiring strict scrutiny review of a Texas school financing
program.121 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County122 the Court
noted that it did not consider higher education a vital governmental
benefit whose denial would penalize the exercise of one's right to
114. See, eg., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (hold-
ing that education is a fundamental right); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (treating classifications based on gender as suspect).
115. 87 U.S. (20 Wail.) 590 (1875).
116. Id at 634-35.
117. Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 125-26 (1945).
118. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy
clause).
119. See, eg., White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773-74, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94,
105-06 (1975); Sail'er Inn, Inc.. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341
(1971) (treating gender as a suspect classification); CAL_ CONST. art. 1, §1 (California right to
privacy is right to be left alone).
120. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussed with further detail infra).
121. Id at 35.
122. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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travel. 23
The United States Supreme Court having decided that education is a
matter of local concern best left in the hands of the states, the Supreme
Court of California, interpreting the state's own constitution pursuant
to the doctrine of adequate state grounds, has held that education is a
fundamental right and has invalidated statutes that interfere with it.
1. Education as a Fundamental Right
Serrano v. Priest,24 a 1976 California Supreme Court decision inter-
preting the state constitution, laid the foundation for the case against
Assembly Bill 251. In Serrano, plaintiffs brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of the California public school financing system.
Under the existing scheme, public schools were financed from local
property taxes. 125 Consequently, schools in neighborhoods with a low
tax base provided a learning environment inferior to that offered in
schools located in wealthier districts.' 2 6 While an appeal to the
Supreme Court of California was pending, the United States Supreme
Court decided San Antonio Unffied School District v. Rodriguez,27 rul-
ing on the constitutionality of a similar public school financing system
in Texas. Rodriguez held that education was not a fundamental right
because a right to education was not expressly or implicity provided for
or protected by the federal Constitution.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California refused to follow the
result in Rodriguez. Instead, the court's opinion in Serrano observed
that the right to education was expressly provided for and protected by
the California Constitution and for that reason education in California
must be regarded as a fundamental right. 129 Proceeding on this conclu-
sion the court analyzed the statute under the strict standard of review,
shifting the burden of proof to the state to show that the financing sys-
tem was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. The court
concluded that the state had not met this level of proof and invalidated
the statutory scheme as violative of the rights of students to equal pro-
tection under the state constitution.'
30
Although Serrano involved primary and secondary public education,
the court's conclusion that education is a fundamental right logically
123. Id at 259.
124. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
125. Id at 737-38, 557 P.2d at 932-33, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
126. Id at 747-48, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
127. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
128. Id at 35.
129. See 18 Cal. 3d at 763-66, 557 P.2d at 950-51, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
130. Id at 768, 557 P.2d at 952-53, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
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applies to higher education as well. The provisions in the constitution
referred to by the court as granting Californians a fundamental right to
education were Article IX, sections 1 and 5, and Article XVI, section
8.131 Both articles appear to incorporate higher education within their
scope. Article IX, section 1 reads:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legisla-
ture shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellec-
tual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement.' 32
Article XVI, section 8 plainly refers to higher education: "From all
state revenues there shall first be set apart the monies to be applied by
the state for support of the public school system and public institutions
of higher education."1 33
A right to education, then, is provided for by the state constitution
and for this reason was declared "fundamental" by the California
Supreme Court. The relevant language in the constitution does not
limit the right to a particular level of education. Rather, the right to
higher education, particularly state-subsidized higher education, is ex-
pressly protected as a budgetary priority. 134 To the extent Assembly
Bill 251 singles out a class of people and conditions their exercise of
this right, it must be evaluated under the strict test of judicial review to
determine whether the classification is justified.135
Before proceeding with analysis under the strict standard of review,
however, a preliminary point must be addressed. The contention can
be made that bona fide California residents who are caught in the over-
breadth of Assembly Bill 251 are not denied their fundamental right to
higher education-they simply must pay more for it. This argument
was advanced by state officials in a 1981 case, Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 36 in which public funds were being
withheld from Medi-Cal recipients choosing to have an abortion. In
deciding the case, the Supreme Court of California declined to follow
the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. McRae. 137 Har-
131. Id at 764, n.42, 557 P.2d at 950 n.42, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 n.42.
132. CAL. CONST., art. IX, §1.
133. Id art. XVI, §8.
134. Id;see also CAL. EDUC. CODE §66201:
It is the intent of the Legislature that each resident of California who has the capacity
and motivation to benefit from higher education should have the opportunity to enroll in
an institution of higher education. Once enrolled he should have the opportunity to
continue as long and as far as his capacity and motivation... will lead lm... The
Legislature hereby reaffirms the commitment of the State of California to provide an
appropriate place in California public higher education for every student who is willing
and able to benefit from attendance.
135. 18 Cal. 3d at 768, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
136. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
137. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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ris held that, while the right to choose an abortion was a fundamental
right protected by the federal Constitution, public funds to secure an
abortion were not similarly protected. 138 Instead, the California court
in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights declared invalid as viola-
tive of the privacy and equal protection clauses of the state constitution
those items in the budget that withheld Medi-Cal funds from recipients
who chose to have abortions. 39 The court stated, "the governing Cali-
fornia cases. . . have long held that a discriminatory or restricted gov-
ernment benefit program demands special scrutiny whether or not it
erects some new or additional obstacle that impedes the exercise of
constitutional rights."' 40 The opinion concluded that while the state is
under no duty to subsidize public health care, if it elects to 'do so it
cannot arbitrarily withhold that benefit when nonreceipt of Medi-Cal
funds would prevent some persons entitled to funds from exercising
their fundamental right to an abortion.' 4 ' Applying this principle to
Assembly Bill 251, denying lower, in-state tuition to residents entitled
to lower tuition will prevent residents who cannot afford to pay out-of-
state rates from exercising their fundamental right to higher education.
Accordingly, the strict scrutiny test is the appropriate standard of re-
view to apply to a constitutional challenge to Assembly Bill 251.
Under this standard, the presumption of constitutionality normally at-
taching to legislative classifications disappears and the state must show
that the classification used in the statute is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest. 142
2. The State's Compelling Interest
The foregoing section showed that by interfering with the fundamen-
tal right of California residents to publicly funded higher education,
Assembly Bill 251 is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. The ques-
tion remains whether the financial independence classification is justifi-
able as necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If the state can
138. Id at 316-17.
139. 29 Cal. 3d at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
140. Id at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
141. Id at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Chief Justice Bird, concurring, wrote:
An artificial distinction between so called direct and indirect infringement begs the ques-
tion as to whether the state has infringed a fundamental right. ... The fact that the
state has not banned the exercise of the right entirely is irrelevant to the basic issue. Our
courts have frequently struck down restrictions that did not completely prohibit the exer-
cise of a fundamental right. [Citations omitted.] If the exercise of the right is burdened,
a compelling interest must be shown to avoid constitutional validity regardless of the
manner of infringement.
Id. at 288 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
142. 18 Cal. 3d at 768, 557 P.2d at 952-53, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
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support this burden of proof, the amendment will remain law, even
though in practice it results in inequality.
The concern that motivated the Legislature to enact Assembly Bill
251 was that under prior law nonresident students were able to create
sham residences and thereby receive a state-subsidized education, when
at the same time neither the students nor their parents paid taxes in
California. 143 By forcing nonresident students to pay out-of-state tui-
tion, the state would both decrease its cost and increase its revenue.'"
In Boren v. Calfornia Department of Employment Development, 145 the
California Court of Appeal indicated that dollar savings, while a legiti-
mate state interest, is not a compelling state interest that could indepen-
dently support an improper classification.' 46 The court stated:
A state may not preserve the fiscal integrity of its programs by invidi-
ous distinctions between classes of citizens. [Citations omitted.]
When a statutory classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the state
must do more than show the exclusion saves money. 147
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the state could advance
some compelling interest other than dollar savings, the financial inde-
pendence classification is still an unnecessarily drastic means of achiev-
ing the statute's legitimate aim of distinguishing residents from
nonresidents. As mentioned earlier, the Education Code provides for
case-by-case evaluation of students' reclassification requests, including
the taking of individual testimony under oath.'48Admissions officers
may require students to produce documentation supporting their an-
swers to questionnaires and statements under oath. '49 These proce-
dures are designed to ascertain the two statutory elements of residence,
presence and intent."° Instead of overriding these existing procedures,
the financial independence factor could be incorporated with them to
make the discovery of intent more effective. For example, the statute
could take into account only present financial ties with parents. The
existence of these ties could be considered only as a factor negating
intent to establish residence in California which could be rebutted by
sufficient evidence of intent to stay beyond college. Finally, this factor
could be made applicable to transferring students as well as continuing
students seeking reclassification. By revising the amendment as pro-
posed, the state's objective of saving money and raising revenue would
143. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
144. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, supra note 9, at 1242.
145. 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1976).
146. Id at 261, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
147. Id.
148. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68041.
149. 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §41907.
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE §68062(d).
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still be achieved, at least to the extent permissible. Dependents of out-
of-state taxpayers who are in fact temporary California residents be-
cause they intend to remain in the state only for the purpose of ob-
taining a college education, would pay nonresident tuition.
In sum, applying the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection re-
view to Assembly Bill 251, it appears the amendment cannot be justi-
fied as necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Thus,
Assembly Bill 251 fails the test for constitutionality under the equal
protection clauses of the California constitution and should be
amended or repealed.
CONCLUSION
Assembly Bill 251 is intended as a dollar-saving measure, the legiti-
mate purpose of which is separating true residents from nonresidents.
The amendment erects a separate obstacle for students attending state
colleges and universities who wish to establish residence, by requiring
the financial independence of students as a condition to residence
reclassification.
The classification of students into two groups-those who are
financially dependent on parents and those who are not-does not ef-
fectively serve the state's purpose of distinguishing residents from non-
residents. Rather, the statute tends to charge nonresident tuition to
students entering college directly from high school. As the California
Education Code purports to be concerned with ascertaining students'
residence in fact, Assembly Bill 251 creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion of nonresidency in violation of due process under the United
States Supreme Court decisions of P17andis v. Kline and Weinberger v.
Saf.
In addition, the amendment infringes the equal protection rights of
new residents who, as a result of the financial independence require-
ment, are denied lower tuition. Under the California state constitution,
education-including higher education-is a fundamental right. The
California Supreme Court has held that public funding for a funda-
mental right cannot be arbitrarily withheld. Thus, the appropriate test
for judicial review permits the statute to employ an inexact classifica-
tion only if that is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
The state interest in dollar savings, while legitimate, is not a compelling
state interest that can justify the inequitable effects of Assembly Bill
251.
Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New
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York,15 1 wrote:
[Njothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
[state] officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take
no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
laws be equal in operation. 152
The risk of arbitrary state action of which Justice Jackson warned is
greatest when the class of persons affected by the statute is effectively
insulated from the political process, because persons without a vote
cannot exert political pressure on the Legislature to alter its policies. 153
New residents of California had no political voice in the state when
they were yet residents of other states. Laws affecting the rights of new
residents must therefore be scrutinized by the judiciary even more
closely than laws affecting other groups if the rights of new residents to
due process and equal protection are to be fairly protected.
Timothy Billie
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151. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
152. Id at 112-13.
153. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
